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Butwinick v. Hepner, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 65 (Dec. 27, 2012)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Summary
The Court considered Respondents’ motion to substitute themselves as the real parties in
interest after acquiring Appellants’ rights and interests in the underlying district court action at a
judgment execution sale, and to dismiss Appellants’ appeal from a district court order.
Disposition/Outcome
Although Nevada’s judgment execution statutes permit a judgment creditor to execute on
a debtor’s personal property, including the right to bring an action to recover a debt, money, or
thing, those statutes do not include the right to execute on a party’s defenses to an action, and
permitting a judgment creditor to execute on a judgment in such a way would cut off a debtor’s
defenses in a manner inconsistent with due process principles.
Factual and Procedural History
Within the district court, Respondents brought suit against Appellants, alleging breach of
contract and fraud and tort-based claims related to an asset purchase and sale agreement, under
which Respondents purchased two furniture stores from Appellants. Although the Appellants
answered and filed a counterclaim, arguing that Respondents failed to make payments on the
promissory note used for the owner-financed purchase of the stores, the district court entered
judgment for Respondents and allowed Respondents to rescind the agreement.
Respondents obtained a writ of execution on the judgment, thereby allowing them to
execute against Appellants’ personal property. Following Appellants’ unsuccessful attempts to
restrain the sale of Appellants’ personal property and quash the writ of execution, Respondents
executed against Appellants’ property by purchasing Appellants’ rights and interests in the
district court action.
Respondents argued that NRS 10.045 2 and NRS 21.080(1) 3 allowed Respondents to
execute against Appellants’ defenses as personal property. As such, Respondents moved to
substitute as real parties in interest under NRAP 43 and to dismiss the appeal under NRAP 42(b),
on the basis that Respondents acquired Appellants’ defenses. 4 Appellants opposed the motion
and argued that an appellant’s defenses to an underlying lawsuit is not personal property subject
to execution during the pendency of an appeal.
1

By Robert Stewart.
NEV. REV. STAT. 10.045 (2007) (defining personal property).
3
NEV. REV. STAT. 21.080(1) (2007) (describing property liable to execution).
4
Nev. R. App. P. 43 (laying forth the rule on substitution of parties); Nev. R. App. P. 42(b) (laying forth the rule on
voluntary dismissal in the Supreme Court of Nevada).
2

Discussion
The Court issued a per curiam opinion. The Court first laid forth the parameters of
personal property, stating that “[u]nder NRS 10.045, personal property includes things in action.”
Then, after noting that Respondents cited no authority to support the proposition that Appellants’
defenses to Respondents’ underlying lawsuit constitute a “thing in action” subject to execution
under NRS 21.080 and NRS 10.045, and that Respondents offered no authority, nor did the
Court find any, to support the proposition that a litigant’s defenses are assignable, the Court held
that Nevada’s judgment execution statutes do not contemplate executing on defensive appellate
rights as property.
In noting the adverse results that would exist if the Court were to view defensive
appellate rights as property and grant Respondents’ motion, the Court stated that such a route
would foreclose both Appellants’ defenses to Respondents’ underlying claims and Appellants’
appeal to the resultant district court order.
Conclusion
The Court denied Respondents’ motion because Nevada’s judgment execution statutes do
no contemplate executing on defensive appellate rights as property.

